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In honor of the publication of From Chance to Choice: Genetics and 
Justice, the University of San Diego School of Law held a two day 
symposium on the book.  The essays in this collection emerge from that 
symposium.  Some of the essays respond to the authors’ arguments as a 
whole or to specific aspects of these arguments.  Other essays push 
beyond the limits of the book, suggesting problems not raised by the 
authors or otherwise challenging the book’s presupposition that genetic 
interventions will transform our society. 
First, Arti K. Rai, Assistant Professor at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, responds to chapters 3 and 4.  In these 
chapters, the authors argue that distributing genetic interventions in a 
manner that restores individuals to normal functioning will preserve 
equality of opportunity and thus will adequately address the distributive 
justice dilemmas raised by such interventions.  Moreover, according to 
the authors, the conditions that prevent such normal functioning are 
generally limited to inequalities that could be considered diseases.  Thus, 
according to the authors, a treatment versus enhancement distinction is a 
plausible mechanism for allocating genetic intervention resources. 
In Genetic Interventions: (Yet) Another Challenge to Allocating 
Health Care, Rai suggests that the treatment versus enhancement 
approach is both underinclusive and overinclusive.  The authors’ approach 
is overinclusive, reasons Professor Rai, because it does not adequately 
limit the services society needs to provide all individuals; that is to say, 
it fails to account for the scarcity dilemma.  By the same token, the 
exclusion of interventions for conditions that are not diseases is 
underinclusive; enhancements that might further equality of 
opportunity are excluded simply because they are not treatments for 
recognized diseases.  The authors anticipate that the concept of disease 
will change over time and ultimately use the disease concept to 
encompass all correctable genetic conditions that adversely impact 
equality.  This implies, according to Rai, that the distinction between 
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treatment and enhancement is purely semantic.  Loyalty to the 
distinction should be abandoned and the underlying issue of equality 
should be the focus of concern.  After critiquing the method of resource 
allocation set forth by the authors, Professor Rai sets forth several 
alternative suggestions, noting the possible drawbacks of each. 
Like Professor Rai, Professor Mark A. Hall of the Wake Forest 
University School of Law and School of Medicine is concerned with the 
authors’ proposed distinction between treatments and enhancements.  In 
Genetic Enhancement, Distributive Justice, and the Goals of Medicine, 
Professor Hall focuses on chapter 4 of the book.  Hall identifies this 
chapter, which distinguishes between treatment of disease and 
enhancement of genetic traits, as the one in which the authors appear to 
have the greatest ideological disagreement.  Professor Hall notes that 
many of the moral and ethical issues surrounding the field of genetics 
tend to revolve around the treatment versus enhancement distinction. 
Professor Hall notes that what is currently normal may not always be 
considered so.  In examining the concept of distributive justice, which 
focuses on achieving balance by closing gaps in equality, Hall argues 
that a compromise must be made between holding certain people back in 
violation of their liberties and exceeding what is practical in order to 
elevate those in need.  Hall concludes that the goal of distributive justice 
should be to achieve as much equality of opportunity as is technically 
feasible without compromising other important social and ethical 
demands.  For example, Hall identifies a shift in the later part of the 
twentieth century from the treatment and prevention of disease to  
increased attention on a more wholistic concept of health and well-
being.  This change in focus has resulted in an evolving concept of what 
is medically necessary for health insurance to cover.  Likewise, genetic 
engineering has a tremendous potential to change our view of what is 
normal and what are the proper goals of medicine.  Professor Hall 
concludes that the normal species functioning model may be the best 
current guide, but its application by the authors fails to consider the very 
real possibility that the goals of medicine may change dramatically. 
In addition to challenging our assumptions regarding distributive 
justice, genetics puts new pressures on individual and institutional 
choice.  From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice introduces ethical 
principles designed to guide individuals and institutions through genetics 
issues.  The authors took a middle road between the extreme paths of the 
public health model, designed to improve the genetic health of society, 
and the personal services model, which emphasizes individual choice.  
In Punishing Reproductive Choices in the Name of Liberal Genetics, 
Alexander Morgan Capron, Professor of Equity, Professor of Medicine, 
and Co-Director of the Pacific Center for Health Policy and Ethics at the 
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University of Southern California, praises the authors for carefully 
structuring their arguments and thoroughly exploring the implications of 
different concepts of justice for genetic interventions.  Capron is 
ultimately unpersuaded, however, by the authors’ conclusions because of 
the way in which their moral reasoning applies to social policies. 
To critique the authors’ ethical principles, Capron evaluates their 
discussion in chapter 6 about reproductive freedom and its application to 
genetic testing, counseling, and manipulation.  Reproductive freedom 
cannot be attached to an individual, according to Capron.  Because this 
freedom involves the decision about whether to procreate at all, the act 
must encompass a reproducing couple.  This lack of individual autonomy 
further complicates issues of reproductive freedom and decisions 
regarding genetic modification.  Capron casts doubt on the authors’ 
conclusion that parents are morally wrong in not taking steps to prevent 
overwhelming burdens to their children caused by genetic conditions.  
Capron’s analysis questions whether the authors have stepped in an ironic 
quagmire by attempting to prevent the eugenic abuses of the past. 
Janet Radcliffe Richards, Reader in Bioethics at University College 
London, examines the claim of the radical disability movement, 
discussed in chapter 7, that genetic technology must not be used to 
prevent or cure disability because this would imply that disabled people 
were of less worth than the able.  The authors of From Chance to 
Choice: Genetics and Justice concede a great many of the radical 
campaigners’ arguments, but claim that nevertheless the use of 
technology to cure or prevent disability can be justified without any 
denial of equal worth to the disabled.   
Radcliffe Richards agrees with the authors’ conclusion that genetic 
techniques should be used to prevent disability but, in How Not to End 
Disability, argues that their justification is inadequate.  First, they do not 
sufficiently meet the radical argument that to try to prevent the existence 
of these people is to imply that they are of unequal worth, because they 
overlook an ambiguity in the idea of equal worth.  Radcliffe Richards 
explains that the authors are right to claim that their view allows the 
disabled equal intrinsic worth, but detailed consideration of the radical 
ideas shows that the movement’s distinctive concerns are with the lesser 
instrumental value of disabled people.  The authors’ claim does not meet 
this concern, and in fact their case depends on regarding disabled 
people as of lesser value in this and similar ways.  Nevertheless, Radcliffe 
Richards argues, the radical disability movement’s case still cannot be 
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made out, because the authors concede too much in allowing the radical 
claim that disability is largely a social construction.  In fact, Radcliffe 
Richards argues, no amount of social reorganization can turn disabilities 
into abilities, or vice versa, and therefore by far the best way to end the 
disadvantages of disabled people is to prevent or cure disability itself, by 
whatever technological means are available.  
In his critique, Richard J. Arneson, Professor of Philosophy at 
University of California San Diego, takes a more global and theoretical 
approach to the authors’ thesis.  In Is Moral Theory Perplexed by New 
Genetic Technology?, he claims that the authors exaggerated the extent 
to which the moral issues posed by advances in genetic knowledge are 
new and understated the resources of current moral theories to resolve 
these issues in an intuitively satisfactory manner.  According to Arneson, 
this underestimation of current theory results from neglect of the 
consequentalist family of views (these assert that one morally ought 
always to do whatever will produce the best outcome).  In this 
connection Arneson finds prioritarianism to be especially promising.  
Prioritarianism identifies the morally right action or policy with the one 
that maximizes a function of human well-being that prefers greater to 
lesser aggregate well-being but also gives priority to obtaining gains in 
well-being for the worse off.  Arneson contrasts the prioritarian approach 
to the question, what is owed to the severely disabled, with the authors’ 
discussion of what they claimed to be the new problem of the morality 
of inclusion.  Arneson also compares the prioritarian approach to health 
care justice with the approach embraced by the authors—the Rawlsian 
fair equality of opportunity doctrine extended to include health care.  
The tentative conclusion reached is that the degree of moral perplexity 
induced by advances in genetic knowledge is less than the authors 
proposed.        
Rebecca Dresser, Professor of Law and Ethics in Medicine at 
Washington University in St. Louis, seeks to further address two topics 
that were not fully addressed by the authors of From Chance to 
Choice: Genetics and Justice.  In The Ethics of Genetic Intervention: 
Human Research and Blurred Species Boundaries, Dresser focuses 
primarily on ethical issues associated with researching genetic 
interventions and the effects of interspecies genetic studies that may blur 
the moral lines shaping our view of what is ethical genetic manipulation. 
Dresser comments that genetic manipulation and germ line 
intervention in embryos will require parents to allow their children to 
undergo extended experimentation.  Initial testing will likely be limited 
to extreme cases where children face poor quality of life and where 
conventional treatment techniques offer little hope for recovery or have 
risk factors equal to, or greater than, genetic manipulation.  Accurate 
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analysis of the effectiveness of any procedure would require 
randomized clinical testing in order to separate the results of genetic 
intervention from environmental issues.  Doing so could involve blind 
testing, requiring parents to undergo in vitro procedures, possibly 
receiving no genetic intervention as part of a control group.  These 
complicated decisions are compounded by the fact that scientists do not 
currently have a standard of safety by which to evaluate potential 
clinical interventions. 
Dresser also believes that the authors failed to confront the broader 
implications of genetic intervention for our perspective of distributive 
justice.  While the authors focused on the concept of justice only as it 
applies to humans, Dresser indicates that the ability to alter the genetic 
makeup of an organism allows scientists to blur traditional species lines 
and raises accordant ethical concerns.  How do we apply justice toward a 
blurred species?  If we add cognitive abilities to the great apes, at what 
point do they become eligible for human-like treatment?  Given our 
current definition of disease as “adverse departures from normal species 
functioning,” how do we apply a concept of normality to a transgenetic 
species?  Many questions remain unanswered, Dresser suggests. 
Robert A. Bohrer, Professor of Law at California Western School of 
Law, invokes a theoretical approach similar to that used by the authors 
to address an issue that may arise as we gain a greater understanding of 
the human genome: employer discrimination based on genetic profiling 
for jobs involving toxic workplaces.  In A Rawlsian Approach to Solving 
the Problem of Genetic Discrimination in Toxic Workplaces, Bohrer 
applies concepts from John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and examines 
workplace discrimination apart from existing laws, like the Americans 
with Disabilities Act.  He presents a hypothetical situation: the risk of 
glioblastoma, a fatal form of brain cancer, increases drastically for 
persons with a certain genetic susceptibility when exposed to small 
amounts of benzene.  An employer could save a considerable amount of 
money by not reducing the level of toxins in the workplace given that a 
majority of workers are not threatened by the present level—only a 
small percentage of potential employees would be likely to contract the 
fatal cancer. 
Bohrer argues for the implementation of a Rawlsian pay-to-exclude 
system, when the appropriate ground rules are in place.  Employers 
could require genetic profiling for a given susceptibility and could refuse 
to hire candidates with a high risk factor.  Doing so would be beneficial 
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to the employee (not being placed in harm’s way) as well as to the 
employer.  However, Rawlsian analysis also dictates that employers pay 
into a central fund based on their realized savings from using genetic 
testing so that individuals denied employment could be compensated for 
their exclusion.  This pay-to-exclude system would prevent employers 
from using tests to exclude in cases where the cost of exposure is low, 
would reduce the use of tests with questionable value, and would 
encourage employers to reduce exposure to rare toxins. 
Rawls’s theory is best applied when behind a veil of ignorance.  
Bohrer believes that the Human Genome Project is a prime example for 
such an analysis because we still know very little about the issues that 
will become known.  By setting ground rules now, we have the ability to 
form the basis for ethical limits that are beneficial to society at large. 
Michael H. Shapiro, Professor of Law at the University of Southern 
California, authors the last piece of the collection.  Rather than critiquing 
the discussion in From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, he 
expands upon the subject matter and offers additional insight on a host 
of moral, legal, and policy issues relating to human genetics.  In Does 
Technological Enhancement of Human Traits Threaten Human Equality 
and Democracy?, Professor Shapiro explores the technical aspects of 
human genetics and relates these issues to legal and moral theories.  He 
delves into the concept of equality and questions whether measuring 
equality is an appropriate means of evaluating moral and social justice.  
A brief discussion follows regarding the way that merit attribute 
enhancement might change the structure of our democratic institutions 
to conform to the type of plural voting system envisioned by John 
Stuart Mill.  Potential constitutional issues are noted in addition to the 
possibility that the moral and policy issues surrounding human genetics 
will ultimately be debated within the legal system. 
Shapiro proposes that several issues raised by the authors should be 
further analyzed.  First, he believes the concepts of merit and desert 
should be further probed.  Shapiro also believes a deeper concept of 
justice should be examined, including its links to equality and to the way 
in which all our basic values, including fairness, autonomy, and utility, 
bear on each other.  Finally, he favors a more thorough examination of 
the potential withering of noncontingent bonds of duty and affection 
between persons.  Professor Shapiro ultimately concludes that the most 
difficult aspect in determining how genetics will impact our value 
system is the ambiguity in the system itself.  Advances in technology 
may undermine the assumptions that form the foundations of our current 
value system.   
EDITORIAL BOARD 
